Reference, perception, and attention.
I examine John Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention. I argue that although Campbell’s claim to the effect that, first, a complex binding parameter is needed to establish the referent of a per...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 144; no. 3; pp. 339 - 361 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=38798772&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 38798772 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2009 vid: 144 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 38798772 10.1007/s11098-008-9213-5 ppf: 339 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 222KB tig: atl: Reference, perception, and attention. aug: au: Raftopoulos, Athanasios affil: Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, Nicosia 1678 Cyprus su: Campbell, John Reference (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Attention Philosophy sug: subj: Campbell, John Reference (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Attention Philosophy keyword: Perception Reference ab: I examine John Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention. I argue that although Campbell’s claim to the effect that, first, a complex binding parameter is needed to establish the referent of a perceptual demonstrative, and, second, that this referent is determined independently of, and before, the application of sortals is correct, this binding parameter does not require object-based attention for its construction. If object-based attention were indeed required then the determination of the referent would necessarily involve the application of sortal concepts, since object-based attention initiates top-down cognitive effects on visual processing. I also examine Mohan Matthen’s claim that reference to objects is established only through the visual processing in the dorsal visual stream and argue that although it is true that processing in the dorsal stream can determine reference, a thesis that goes against Campbell’s view that the determination of the referent requires conscious attention, processing along the ventral visual stream can also establish the reference of perceptual demonstratives. It also claim that Matthen’s account of dorsal processing underestimates the kind of information processed along the dorsal stream and this has some implications regarding perceptual demonstratives reference fixing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2009. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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