When Less Is More: Optimal Patent Breadth under the Threat of Patent Validity Challenges.
This article determines the optimal breadth of patent protection for a drastic process innovation when the innovator faces the likelihood of a direct patent validity challenge by a third party and potential entry and infringement by a competitor who provides a technologically equivalent process. The...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 75; no. 4; pp. 1067 - 1094 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=38907159&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 38907159 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2009 vid: 75 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 38907159 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2009.tb00947.x ppf: 1067 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 7MB tig: atl: When Less Is More: Optimal Patent Breadth under the Threat of Patent Validity Challenges. aug: au: Yiannaka, Amalia affil: Department of Agricultural Economics, 314D Filley Hall, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68583- 0922, USA su: Technological innovations Public spending Patents Patent infringement Research & development projects Deterrence (Military strategy) sug: subj: Technological innovations Public spending Public Finance Activities Offices of Lawyers All Other Legal Services Patents Patent infringement Research & development projects Deterrence (Military strategy) ab: This article determines the optimal breadth of patent protection for a drastic process innovation when the innovator faces the likelihood of a direct patent validity challenge by a third party and potential entry and infringement by a competitor who provides a technologically equivalent process. The effect of the innovator's patent breadth decision on the entrant's incentive to generate a competing process and on the entrant's ability to enter the market is also examined. Analytical results show that the greater the patent breadth, the smaller the entrant's incentive to develop a non-infringing process and the optimal flow of research and development spending. However, when patent breadth can be used to deter entry, the incumbent always prefers to deter entry by choosing the smallest patent breadth possible that could achieve entry deterrence. In addition, when entry cannot be deterred, it is never optimal for the incumbent to claim the maximum patent breadth possible. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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