Oppressive Speech.

I here present two different models of oppressive speech. My interest is not in how speech can cause oppression, but in how speech can actually be an act of oppression. As we shall see, a particular type of speech act, the exercitive, enacts permissibility facts. Since oppressive speech enacts permi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 389 - 408
Main Author: McGowan, MaryKate
Format: Article
Published: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2009
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Oppressive Speech.
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        au: McGowan, MaryKate
        affil: Wellesley College
      su:
        Oppression
        Speech -- Social aspects
        Speech acts (Linguistics)
        Permissiveness
        Social groups
        Racism
        Sexism
      sug:
        subj:
          Oppression
          Speech -- Social aspects
          Speech acts (Linguistics)
          Permissiveness
          Social groups
          Racism
          Sexism
      ab: I here present two different models of oppressive speech. My interest is not in how speech can cause oppression, but in how speech can actually be an act of oppression. As we shall see, a particular type of speech act, the exercitive, enacts permissibility facts. Since oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts that oppress, speech must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression. In what follows, I distinguish between two sorts of exercitive speech acts (the standard exercitive and the covert exercitive) and I argue that each such exercitive affords a distinct model of oppressive speech.
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