Does Four-dimensionalism explain coincidence?

For those who think the statue and the piece of copper that compose it are distinct objects that coincide, there is a burden of explanation. After all, common sense says that different ordinary objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. A common argument in favour of four-dimensionalism...

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Published in:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 479 - 489
Main Author: Moyer, Mark
Format: Article
Published: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2009
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        affil: University of Vermont
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        Fourth dimension
        Coincidence
        Object (Philosophy)
        Spacetime
        Whole & parts (Philosophy)
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          Fourth dimension
          Coincidence
          Object (Philosophy)
          Spacetime
          Whole & parts (Philosophy)
      ab: For those who think the statue and the piece of copper that compose it are distinct objects that coincide, there is a burden of explanation. After all, common sense says that different ordinary objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. A common argument in favour of four-dimensionalism (or 'perdurantism' or 'temporal parts theory') is that it provides the resources for a superior explanation of this coincidence. This, however, is mistaken. Any explanatory work done by the four-dimensionalist notion of absolute parthood rests ultimately on notions equally available to the three-dimensionalist. Thus, a neutral explanation of coincidence is at least as good while avoiding commitment to temporal parts.
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