ON (NOT) BEING IN TWO PLACES AT THE SAME TIME: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ENDURANTISM.

The article discusses the philosophical concern on the assertion that objects can be located in manifold opposite with properties or tropes. It examines endurantism and indexicalism as viewpoints that offer confounding explanations on objects and properties wherein the former affirms that objects re...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 239 - 249
Main Author: Benovsky, Jiri
Format: Article
Published: University of Illinois Press Jul2009
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: ON (NOT) BEING IN TWO PLACES AT THE SAME TIME: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ENDURANTISM.
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        au: Benovsky, Jiri
      su:
        Object (Philosophy)
        Tropes (Philosophy)
        Indexicals (Semantics)
        Spacetime
        Universals (Philosophy)
        O'Leary-Hawthorne, John
        Parson, John
      sug:
        subj:
          Object (Philosophy)
          Tropes (Philosophy)
          Indexicals (Semantics)
          Spacetime
          Universals (Philosophy)
          O'Leary-Hawthorne, John
          Parson, John
      ab: The article discusses the philosophical concern on the assertion that objects can be located in manifold opposite with properties or tropes. It examines endurantism and indexicalism as viewpoints that offer confounding explanations on objects and properties wherein the former affirms that objects remain through time by being totally placed at different times and the latter declares that entire properties are always indexed. It also analyzes the two different views on the scheme that an object can be totally in two places in the same time, wherein the bundle theory of John O'Leary-Hawthorne connotes that universals can be unified into a bundle to create an object while the theory of John Parson introduces the distributional properties.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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