Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.

In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of trut...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 38; no. 4; pp. 363 - 404
Autor principal: Kremer, Philip
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2009
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=42871388&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 42871388
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00223611
        JPH
      jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic
      issn: 00223611
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Aug2009
      vid: 38
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        42871388
        10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9
      ppf: 363
      ppct: 41
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 731KB
      tig:
        atl: Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.
      aug:
        au: Kremer, Philip
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto Canada
      su:
        Semantics
        Information theory
        Truth
        Belief & doubt
        Liar paradox
      sug:
        subj:
          Semantics
          Information theory
          Truth
          Belief & doubt
          Liar paradox
      keyword:
        Fixed-point theory
        Revision theory
      ab: In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2009. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Journal of Philosophical Logic
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2009
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N