Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games.
The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standard...
| Published in: | Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) Vol. 6; no. 2; pp. 200 - 221 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Edinburgh University Press
2009
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=42967252&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 42967252 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 17423600 UP0 jtl: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) issn: 17423600 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2009 vid: 6 iid: 2 pid: 2327 pub: Edinburgh University Press artinfo: ui: 42967252 10.3366/E1742360009000641 ppf: 200 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 554KB tig: atl: Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games. aug: au: SCHURZ, GERHARD affil: Professor of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf su: Social epistemology Computer simulation Simulation methods & models Video games Sociology of knowledge Cognition sug: subj: Social epistemology Computer simulation Simulation methods & models Video games Sociology of knowledge Cognition ab: The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) is the property of Edinburgh University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) holder: Edinburgh University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|