Systematicity redux.
One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilem...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 170; no. 2; pp. 251 - 275 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=43707373&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 43707373 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2009 vid: 170 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 43707373 10.1007/s11229-009-9582-0 ppf: 251 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 198KB tig: atl: Systematicity redux. aug: au: McLaughlin, Brian affil: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 26 Nicole Avenue New Brunswick 08901 USA su: Connectionism Cognitive ability Fodor, Jerry Pylyshyn, Zenon W. Linguistic analysis sug: subj: Connectionism Cognitive ability Fodor, Jerry Pylyshyn, Zenon W. Linguistic analysis keyword: Cognitive architecture Implementation Language of thought Productivity Psychological laws Systematicity Thought abilities ab: One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilemma: if connectionism cannot explain the systematicity of thought, then it fails to offer an adequate theory of cognitive architecture; and if it explains the systematicity of thought by implementing a LOT architecture, then it fails to offer an alternative to the LOT hypothesis. Given that thought is systematic, connectionism can offer an adequate alternative to the LOT hypothesis only if it can meet the challenge. Although some critics tried to meet the challenge, others argued that it need not be met since thought is not in fact systematic; and some claimed not to even understand the claim that thought is systematic. I do not here examine attempts to answer the challenge. Instead, I defend the challenge itself by explicating the notion of systematicity in a way that I hope makes clear that thought is indeed systematic, and so that to offer an adequate alternative to the LOT hypothesis, connectionism must meet the challenge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2009. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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