Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review.
The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value. Abstracted from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must rega...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 23; no. 4; pp. 563 - 585 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=44441719&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 44441719 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01436503 BJ4 jtl: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies issn: 01436503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 23 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 44441719 10.1093/ojls/23.4.563 ppf: 563 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 174KB tig: atl: Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review. aug: au: ALLAN, T. R. S. affil: Reader in Legal and Constitutional Theory, and Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge su: Judicial review Legal justification Courts Judicial supremacy Common law Sovereignty sug: subj: Judicial review Legal justification Courts Judicial supremacy Common law Sovereignty ab: The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value. Abstracted from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must regain its connection with questions of political principle and moral value. Although the critics of ultra vires have rightly emphasized the foundational role of the common law, they have misconceived its nature and implications. On the one hand, they have invited the charge of judicial supremacism by marginalizing the role of legislative intent; on the other, their affirmation of absolute parliamentary sovereignty (within the context of this debate) undermines the critique of ultra vires. In substance, therefore, the rival camps occupy essentially the same ground, equally trapped by a formalism that entrenches a stark confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A conception of shared sovereignty, or interdependent sovereignties, provides a better foundation for judicial review. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Oxford University Press. item: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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