Excess Burden, Benefit Taxation, and Efficiency in Public Expenditure.
The article explores the issue of whether there is a system of taxation which might promote efficiency in public expenditure where the supply of public goods is determined by voting, if direct user charges for public goods are not possible. This is the central issue addressed by the modern theory of...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 70; no. 3; pp. 501 - 507 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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American Economic Association
Jun80
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=4503623&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 4503623 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun80 vid: 70 iid: 3 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 4503623 ppf: 501 ppct: 6 formats: tig: atl: Excess Burden, Benefit Taxation, and Efficiency in Public Expenditure. aug: au: Thomas S. McCaleb affil: Assistant Professor of Economics, Rice University. su: Public spending Tax incidence User charges Benefit theory of taxation Public goods Economic demand Elasticity (Economics) Demand function sug: subj: Public spending Tax incidence User charges Benefit theory of taxation Public goods Economic demand Elasticity (Economics) Demand function ab: The article explores the issue of whether there is a system of taxation which might promote efficiency in public expenditure where the supply of public goods is determined by voting, if direct user charges for public goods are not possible. This is the central issue addressed by the modern theory of benefit taxation. An affirmative answer has been provided to the question and a formula for distributing the tax burden among the individual voters has been developed. The formula implies that an efficient level of public expenditure would be collectively chosen no matter what voting rule might have been established at the constitutional stage of decision making. Application of this neutrality formula, however, requires knowledge of the elasticities of demand for public goods with respect to the variables which influence that demand. It is natural, then, that the formula has reappeared in several recent studies which attempt empirical estimation of demand functions for various public goods. A test based on this formula has been proposed for determining the extent to which the supply of a public good in a particular community deviates from the efficient quantity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 1980 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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