CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETROSUICIDE PARADOX.

If (backward) time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self (YS); then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossi...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 520 - 535
Autor principal: VRANAS, PETER B. M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2009
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETROSUICIDE PARADOX.
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        au: VRANAS, PETER B. M.
        affil: Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin‐Madison
      su:
        Time travel
        Spacetime
        Imaginary voyages
        Science fiction
        Paradox
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          Time travel
          Spacetime
          Imaginary voyages
          Science fiction
          Paradox
      ab: If (backward) time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self (YS); then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossibility with the relevant facts and points to an equivocation about which facts are relevant: my killing YS is compossible with his proximity but not with his survival, so I can kill him if facts like his survival are irrelevant but I cannot if they are relevant. I identify a lacuna in this solution, namely its reliance without argument on the hidden assumption that my killing YS is possible: if it is impossible, it is not compossible with anything. I argue that this lacuna is important, and I sketch a different solution to the paradox.
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