The Equilibrium of Duopoly in a Market of Homogeneous Goods.

In this paper, we consider duopoly equilibria in which firms act rationally on the basis of mutually consistent assumptions about their rivals' behaviour. It turns out that there exist various kinds of equilibria corresponding to various pairs of behaviour patterns. Depending on the relation between...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Economica Vol. 45; no. 179; pp. 287 - 296
Autor principal: Ono, Yoshiyasu
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Aug78
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=4517832&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 4517832
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00130427
        ECA
      jtl: Economica
      issn: 00130427
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Aug78
      vid: 45
      iid: 179
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        4517832
        10.2307/2553073
      ppf: 287
      ppct: 9
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: The Equilibrium of Duopoly in a Market of Homogeneous Goods.
      aug:
        au: Ono, Yoshiyasu
        affil: University of Tokyo
      su:
        Economic equilibrium
        Business enterprises
        Behavior
        Demand function
        Cost
        Monopolies
        Pricing
        Competition
        Quasi contracts
      sug:
        subj:
          Economic equilibrium
          Business enterprises
          Behavior
          Demand function
          Cost
          Monopolies
          Pricing
          Competition
          Quasi contracts
      ab: In this paper, we consider duopoly equilibria in which firms act rationally on the basis of mutually consistent assumptions about their rivals' behaviour. It turns out that there exist various kinds of equilibria corresponding to various pairs of behaviour patterns. Depending on the relation between the firms' cost functions and the market demand functions there are different outcomes: monopoly, limit-pricing, stable asymmetric duopoly with one firm a price-maker and the other (less efficient) firm a price-taker, and unstable symmetric duopoly which might have price competition (as in Bertrand, 1883) or quasi-agreement (Fellner, 1960).
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 1978
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N