The Dynamics of Some Discrete Time Duopoly Price Games Involving Cournot and Related Best-response Strategies.
The article focuses on the concepts, pricing methods and problems of duopoly and presents solutions. Section I displays the demand, cost and utility functions. The price games considered are non-cooperative, with perfect and complete information. Edgeworth rejected Cournot's output dependence in duo...
| Publicado en: | Economica Vol. 45; no. 179; pp. 297 - 304 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Aug78
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=4517847&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 4517847 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130427 ECA jtl: Economica issn: 00130427 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Aug78 vid: 45 iid: 179 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 4517847 10.2307/2553074 ppf: 297 ppct: 7 formats: tig: atl: The Dynamics of Some Discrete Time Duopoly Price Games Involving Cournot and Related Best-response Strategies. aug: au: Murray, Ian W. Rickard, John A. affil: Footscray Institute of Technology, Victoria, and University of Melbourne su: Cost Utility functions Pricing Economic equilibrium Games sug: subj: Cost Utility functions Pricing Economic equilibrium Games ab: The article focuses on the concepts, pricing methods and problems of duopoly and presents solutions. Section I displays the demand, cost and utility functions. The price games considered are non-cooperative, with perfect and complete information. Edgeworth rejected Cournot's output dependence in duopoly and introduced the idea of price dependence. Section III offers solution to the various games. The solution of every game considered in this paper tends to a stable equilibrium at the Cournot point for large time. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 1978 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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