Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies.
In this paper, I am going to assume that the economy is large, or, more precisely, there is a non-atomic measure space of agents. For a private economy, it then becomes easy to characterize the entire class of incentive compatible mechanisms, as will be done in Theorem 2 of Section 3. It is also pos...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 46; no. 2; pp. 263 - 283 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr79
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=4620379&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 4620379 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr79 vid: 46 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 4620379 10.2307/2297050 ppf: 263 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies. aug: au: Hammond, Peter J. affil: University of Essex su: Economics Economic policy Social sciences Business Commerce Finance sug: subj: Economics Economic policy Social sciences Business Commerce Finance ab: In this paper, I am going to assume that the economy is large, or, more precisely, there is a non-atomic measure space of agents. For a private economy, it then becomes easy to characterize the entire class of incentive compatible mechanisms, as will be done in Theorem 2 of Section 3. It is also possible to make rigorous the idea that lump-sum transfers cannot be imposed to achieve a full welfare optimum, because they depend on information which agents will want to hide. In a broad class of economies, in which utilities and demands are continuously differentiable functions of agents' characteristics, the competitive mechanism without lump-sum transfers is the only mechanism which is both incentive compatible and Pareto efficient. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 1979 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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