A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly.

The article presents information on a model of promotional competition in oligopoly. This article is concerned with markets with few sellers and differentiated products. It is a generally accepted "stylized fact" of industrial organization that price competition is relatively rare in such markets. P...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 493 - 508
Autor principal: Schmalensee, Richard
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Oct76
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:The article presents information on a model of promotional competition in oligopoly. This article is concerned with markets with few sellers and differentiated products. It is a generally accepted "stylized fact" of industrial organization that price competition is relatively rare in such markets. Prices generally change infrequently, and sellers compete, if at all, mainly through product variation and promotional expenditures. It is thus of some interest to attempt to model rigorously markets in which the only competition is of this sort, and this essay does so. The article further restrict itself to promotional competition, the products offered by the firms in the market are assumed fixed. Since the Cournot assumption has yielded tractable models of price/quantity competition, and since it is a much more plausible assumption in the case of promotional competition, it seems natural to employ it when modeling such competition. This essay is an exploratory investigation of a number of properties of the resultant models.