Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability.
The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 72; no. 2; pp. 233 - 250 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Mar2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=47800090&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 47800090 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2010 vid: 72 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 47800090 10.1007/s10670-009-9199-1 ppf: 233 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 288KB tig: atl: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability. aug: au: Rummens, Stefan Cuypers, Stefaan affil: Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HK Nijmegen The Netherlands Institute of Philosophy, Centre for Logic & Analytical Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 3000 Leuven Belgium su: Determinism (Philosophy) Methodological individualism Logical prediction Induction (Logic) Thought & thinking Inference (Logic) sug: subj: Determinism (Philosophy) Methodological individualism Logical prediction Induction (Logic) Thought & thinking Inference (Logic) ab: The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such predictions, does not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability—we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2010. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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