Levels of Explanation Reconceived.
A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher-level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher-lev...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 1; pp. 59 - 73 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=48444267&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 48444267 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2010 vid: 77 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 48444267 10.1086/650208 ppf: 59 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 98KB tig: atl: Levels of Explanation Reconceived. aug: au: Potochnik, Angela affil: Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, 246 Murray Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078 su: Explanation Reductionism Pluralism Theory of knowledge Philosophy of science sug: subj: Explanation Reductionism Pluralism Theory of knowledge Philosophy of science ab: A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher-level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher-level explanations are more general than their lower-level alternatives or that higher-level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different levels are preferable in different circumstances because they offer different types of generality, which are appropriate in different circumstances of explanation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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