WHY INFORMATION ETHICS MUST BEGIN WITH VIRTUE ETHICS.
The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments. Drawing from disparate traditional sou...
| Published in: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 41; no. 3; pp. 380 - 402 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2010
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=49205853&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 49205853 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2010 vid: 41 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 49205853 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01638.x ppf: 380 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 216KB tig: atl: WHY INFORMATION ETHICS MUST BEGIN WITH VIRTUE ETHICS. aug: au: VOLKMAN, RICHARD affil: Philosophy Department, Research Center on Computing and Society, Southern Connecticut State University, 501 Crescent Street, New Haven, CT 06515, USA su: Information ethics Virtue Ethics Philosophy Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Information ethics Virtue Ethics Philosophy Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge) keyword: ethical individualism foundationalism information ethics particularism virtue ethics ab: The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments. Drawing from disparate traditional sources like Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Emerson, as well as contemporary advocates of virtue ethics like Nussbaum, Foot, and Williams, the essay shows that the central contentions of IE, including especially the principle of ontological equality, must either express commitments grounded in the particular perspectives we already inhabit, or be without rational or ethical force for us. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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