KRITONAS: TEISINGUMAS KAIP FILOSOFINĖ PROBLEMA.

In an early Plato's dialogue, Crito, a conversation between Socrates and his close friend Crito is described. The court of Athens -- a phenomenon of Greek democracy -- had just sent Socrates to death. Nevertheless, the decision of the court, realized in a formally correct procedure, is emotionally u...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Problems / Problemos Vol. 77; pp. 105 - 122
Main Author: Jankauskas, Skirmantas
Format: Article
Published: Vilnius University 2010
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=49804531&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 49804531
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        13921126
        3D4C
      jtl: Problems / Problemos
      issn: 13921126
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: 2010
      vid: 77
      pid: 16037
      pub: Vilnius University
    artinfo:
      ui:
        49804531
        10.15388/Problemos.2010.0.1897
      ppf: 105
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 734KB
      tig:
        atl: KRITONAS: TEISINGUMAS KAIP FILOSOFINĖ PROBLEMA.
      aug:
        au: Jankauskas, Skirmantas
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius
      su:
        Democracy
        Death
        Plato, 428-347 B.C.
        Socrates, ca. 469-399 B.C.
        Greece
      sug:
        subj:
          Greece
          Democracy
          Death
          Plato, 428-347 B.C.
          Socrates, ca. 469-399 B.C.
      keyword:
        body
        democracy
        justice
        soul
        the many
        the one
        virtue
        daugelis
        demokratija
        dorybė
        kūnas
        siela
        teisingumas
        vienas
      ab:
        In an early Plato's dialogue, Crito, a conversation between Socrates and his close friend Crito is described. The court of Athens -- a phenomenon of Greek democracy -- had just sent Socrates to death. Nevertheless, the decision of the court, realized in a formally correct procedure, is emotionally unacceptable for both his friends and followers. Socrates does not feel guilty, either, and finds strong arguments in his favour. The conflict between Socrates and the Greek polis reveals the duality of justice and makes justice problematic. An attempt is made to reconstruct the formal and concrete premises of two types of justice. One type of justice is related to daily life and thinking and the other to the ethic kind of life and thinking. It is demonstrated that each sphere of activity presupposes a different subject of activity, which results in a different kind of justice. Man is a measure of all things in the sphere of daily life and thinking. Consequently, man is a measure of justice as well. That is why justice in this sphere is relative and could be established exclusively by an arbitrary decision. In the sphere of ethical life and thinking, the value of good is a measure of man. Therefore, absolute justice is possible in this sphere: anyone in any circumstances could remain virtuous and honest. Socrates pursues the attitude of absolute justice: "we must not do wrong at all". Thus, he obeys the decision of the Greek court and saves the soul, i. e. the subject of absolute justice. The present paper concludes with an inference about the meaning of Socrates' choice.
        Viename iš ankstyvųjų Platono dialogų -- „Kritone" perteikiamas pasmerkto myriop Sokrato ir jo artimo bičiulio Kritono pokalbis. Nors Sokrato likimą lėmė graikiškosios demokratijos reiškinys -- formaliai korektiškai realizuota teismo procedūra, tačiau jos rezultatas filosofo bičiuliams ir sekėjams visiškai nepriimtinas emociškai. Pats Sokratas ne tik nesijaučia esąs neteisus, bet ir randa argumentų savo elgesiui pateisinti. Sokrato ir polio konfliktas atskleidžia esant du teisingumus ir suproblemina patį teisingumą. Straipsnyje mėginama rekonstruoti abiejų teisingumų turiningąsias ir formaliąsias prielaidas. Vienas iš teisingumų siejamas su kasdienio gyvenimo bei mąstymo kontūru, kitas -- su etinio gyvenimo bei mąstymo sfera. Parodoma, kad kiekviena veiklos sfera numato skirtingus veiklos subjektus, o jų prigimties skirtumai lemia savitas teisingumo sampratas. Kasdienio gyvenimo ir mąstymo srityje anonimiškas žmogus yra visų (socialinės prigimties) daiktų -- taigi ir teisingumo -- matas. Todėl čia teisingumas yra neišvengiamai reliatyvus ir gali būti nustatomas tik arbitraliu sprendimu. Etinės elgsenos ir mąstymo sferoje gėrio vertybė yra paties žmogaus matas. Todėl šioje sferoje galimas absoliutus teisingumas: kiekvienam bet kuriomis aplinkybėmis duota būti doram ir sąžiningam. Sokratas vadovaujasi etinės sferos absoliutaus teisingumo nuostata, skelbiančia, jog „apskritai negalima neteisingai elgtis", paklūsta emociškai nepriimtinam polio teismo sprendimui ir gelbsti etinio teisingumo subjektą -- sielą. Straipsnį vainikuoja išvada apie tokio pasirinkimo prasmę.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: Lithuanian
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Problems / Problemos
      holder: Vilnius University
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2010
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N