AR HETEROFENOMENOLOGIJA ĮVEIKIA AUTOFENOMENOLOGIJĄ?

Daniel C. Dennett's heterophenomenological method for analyzing the experiences of one's consciousness using the third person approach, as well as an analysis of the argument correctness of its superiority over the autophenomenology or introspective method of the first person approach applied in Edm...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 77; pp. 70 - 80
Autor principal: Molotokienė, Ernesta
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2010
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.15388/Problemos.2010.0.1900
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        atl: AR HETEROFENOMENOLOGIJA ĮVEIKIA AUTOFENOMENOLOGIJĄ?
      aug:
        au: Molotokienė, Ernesta
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius
      su:
        Phenomenology
        Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
        Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938
        Consciousness
        Subjectivity
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        subj:
          Phenomenology
          Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
          Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938
          Consciousness
          Subjectivity
      keyword:
        autophenomenology
        consciousness
        experience
        heterophenomenology
        intentionality
        method
        autofenomenologija
        heterofenomenologija
        intencionalumas
        metodas
        patyrimas
        sąmonė
      ab:
        Daniel C. Dennett's heterophenomenological method for analyzing the experiences of one's consciousness using the third person approach, as well as an analysis of the argument correctness of its superiority over the autophenomenology or introspective method of the first person approach applied in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology are presented. By introducing the third person perpective, Dennett seeks to bestow the impartiality which is typical of the nature sciences, to heterophenomenological method. The Husserl autophenomenology project had failed in this field because of its inevitable subjectivity. Therefore, Dennett provides the subject's messages about experiences of consciousness with the conviction status, which is legitimated not by the subject but by the observer (the heterophenomenologist), and in this way he carries out the scientific research of the subject's convictions about the experiences of consciousness. But can the subject's convictions be neutral, without a shell of subjective interpretation, as Dennett expects them to be? The article argues that the ambitious heterophenomenologic method of Dennett is unable to avoid the subjectivity typical of Husserl's phenomenology, because Dennett interprets Husserl incorrectly by twisting his ideas, but is unable to elude the drawbacks of autophenomenology.
        Straipsnyje aptariamas Danielio C. Dennetto pasiūlytas heterofenomenologijos metodas, pretenduojantis sąmonės patirtis tirti iš trečiojo asmens perspektyvos, ir analizuojamas argumentų už šio metodo pranašumą autofenonomenologijos, arba Edmundo Husserlio fenomenologijoje taikomo introspekcijos metodo iš pirmojo asmens perspektyvos atžvilgiu, korektiškumas. Dennettas, įvesdamas trečio asmens perspektyvą, heterofenomenologijos metodui siekia suteikti gamtos mokslų metodams būdingo objektyvumo, kurio nepavyko pasiekti Husserlio autofenomenologijos projektui dėl neišvengiamo subjektyvumo veiksnio. Todėl Dennettas subjektų pranešimams apie sąmonės patirtis suteikia įsitikinimų statusą, kurį legitimuoja jau ne pats subjektas, o stebėtojas (heterofenomenologas), šitaip atlikdamas mokslinį subjektų įsitikinimų apie sąmonės patirtis tyrimą. Bet ar subjektų pranešti įsitikinimai gali būti neutralūs, be subjektyvios interpretacijos apvalkalo, kaip to tikisi Dennettas? Straipsnyje tvirtinama, kad ambicingas Dennetto heterofenomenologijos metodas neišvengia Husserlio fenomenologijai būdingo subjektyvumo, nes Dennettas nekorektiškai interpretuoja Husserlį, iškreipdamas, bet neišvengdamas autofenomenologijai priskiriamų trūkumų.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: Lithuanian
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