In-Group versus Out-Group Trust: The Impact of Income Inequality.
In this article, we adopt a variant of the trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and the dictator game by Cox (2004) to determine if income inequality can activate in-group favoritism and, if so, whether such a bias is strong enough to survive the removal of income inequality. We find evid...
| Published in: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 76; no. 4; pp. 1049 - 1064 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2010
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=50137313&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 50137313 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2010 vid: 76 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 50137313 10.4284/sej.2010.76.4.1049 ppf: 1049 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 4.8MB tig: atl: In-Group versus Out-Group Trust: The Impact of Income Inequality. aug: au: Lei, Vivian Vesely, Filip affil: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 3210 N. Maryland Avenue, Bolton Hall 818, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 3210 N. Maryland Avenue, Bolton Hall 812, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong su: Income inequality Income Social cohesion Trust Social classes Equality sug: subj: Income inequality Income Social cohesion Trust Social classes Equality ab: In this article, we adopt a variant of the trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and the dictator game by Cox (2004) to determine if income inequality can activate in-group favoritism and, if so, whether such a bias is strong enough to survive the removal of income inequality. We find evidence of in-group favoritism only on the part of rich first movers. Rich first movers trust their in-group members significantly more in the presence of income inequality not only before but also after they gain enough experience. Poor first movers, in contrast, do not exhibit such in-group bias. They do not discriminate between in-group and out-group at the very outset of the experiment, and once they become experienced, they behave with significantly more trust toward the rich than toward the poor. We also find that in-group and out-group favoritism established in the past can be alleviated, but not completely removed, by an equal income distribution. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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