An economic analysis of criminal attempt: marginal deterrence and the optimal structure of sanctions.

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology Vol. 81; pp. 398 - 418
Main Author: Kramer, Samuel
Format: Article
Published: Northwestern University Summer1990
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: Summer1990
      vid: 81
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      pub: Northwestern University
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        atl: An economic analysis of criminal attempt: marginal deterrence and the optimal structure of sanctions.
      aug:
        au: Kramer, Samuel
      su:
        Punishment in crime deterrence
        Economic impact of crime
        Criminal behavior
      sug:
        subj:
          Punishment in crime deterrence
          Economic impact of crime
          Criminal behavior
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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