Aggregation, auctions, and other developments in the selection of lead counsel under the PSLRA.

Part of a special issue on complex litigation topics. The writer discusses the use of aggregation, sealed bid auctions, and other developments of lead counsel under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995. She indicates that both aggregation—which is intended to unite large nu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:	Law & Contemporary Problems Vol. 64; no. 2/3; pp. 53 - 97
Autor principal:	Fisch, Jill E.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Duke University Spring/Summer2001
Materias:	Attorney & client Civil procedure Decision making Trial practice Investment fraud Class actions Lawyers' fees Class counsel Auctions
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost

Descripción
Sumario:	Part of a special issue on complex litigation topics. The writer discusses the use of aggregation, sealed bid auctions, and other developments of lead counsel under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995. She indicates that both aggregation—which is intended to unite large numbers of unrelated investors into a lead plaintiff group—and the appointment of lead counsel through sealed bid auctions conducted by the courts are problematic, because they undermine the relationship between the statutory lead plaintiff and class council. She asserts that they thus reduce the ability of the lead plaintiff to monitor the litigation and thereby potentially frustrate the objectives of the PSLRA.