Too many probabilities: statistical evidence of tort causation.
Part of a special issue on causation in law and science. The writer contends that the lack of congruity between legal and scientific standards is most glaring when testimony derived from statistical or scientific approaches is used to prove causation in tort law. He observes that medical scientifi...
| Publicado en: | Law & Contemporary Problems Vol. 64; no. 4; pp. 191 - 213 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Duke University
Autumn2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Part of a special issue on causation in law and science. The writer contends that the lack of congruity between legal and scientific standards is most glaring when testimony derived from statistical or scientific approaches is used to prove causation in tort law. He observes that medical scientific testimony is frequently articulated in terms of two different probabilities: the estimation of increased probability of harm if a person is exposed to, say, a toxin; or the probability that an observed relationship is an artifact of the experimental method. He asserts that the two probabilities assess different phenomena and that neither measures whether causation is more likely than not. |
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