Scientific models of human health risk analysis in legal and policy decisions.

Part of a special issue on causation in law and science. The writer notes that scientists working within the fields of law or policy confronted with risk-based decisions find themselves in very different positions epistemologically than those working within their own discipline. For example, he de...

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Publicado en:Law & Contemporary Problems Vol. 64; no. 4; pp. 63 - 82
Autor principal: Crawford-Brown, Douglas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Duke University Autumn2001
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Forensic medicine
        Health risk assessment
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          Forensic medicine
          Health risk assessment
      ab: Part of a special issue on causation in law and science. The writer notes that scientists working within the fields of law or policy confronted with risk-based decisions find themselves in very different positions epistemologically than those working within their own discipline. For example, he describes science as being a process in which truth is progressively refined and approached; the court or policy approach requires the process to be frozen into a “fact” that is regarded as final. He also contends that it is problematic when a single scientist, or a small group of them, is called upon to speak on behalf of the entire scientific community. He proposes that the quality of scientific predictions of risk in the legal and policy arenas depends largely on how the two differences in approach can be reconciled.
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