Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason.
Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply by virtue of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising avenue...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology Vol. 98; no. 1; pp. 147 - 207 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Northwestern University
Fall2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=502580524&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 502580524 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00914169 CLC jtl: Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology issn: 00914169 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Fall2007 vid: 98 iid: 1 pid: 1093 pub: Northwestern University artinfo: ui: 502580524 ppf: 147 ppct: 60 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 3.8MB tig: atl: Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason. aug: au: Ohlin, Jens David su: Conspiracy Criminal liability Collective behavior sug: subj: Conspiracy Criminal liability Collective behavior keyword: United States -- Supreme Court -- Decisions ab: Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply by virtue of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising avenue for solving the Pinkerton paradox is an appeal to the collective intention of the conspiratorial group to commit the crime. Unfortunately, misplaced skepticism about the notion of a “group will” has prevented criminal scholars from embracing the notion of a conspiracy's collective intention to commit a crime. However, positing group intentions requires only that the criminal law recognize the rational relationships between individuals who decide to collectivize reason to pursue a common criminal goal; no burdensome theory of corporate animals with unified minds is required. After exploring the different rational structures that a conspiracy can have, the Article outlines the circumstances when vicarious liability could be justified Specifically, liability must be limited to participants in tightly knit conspiracies who engage in the kind of common deliberation that is capable of yielding collective intentions. A further consequence of this theory is that liability must be restricted to acts that fall within the scope of the criminal plan, not just acts that should have been reasonably foreseeable to members of the conspiracy. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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