In defence of error theory.

Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 149; no. 2; pp. 209 - 231
Autores principales: Daly, Chris, Liggins, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=50328789&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 50328789
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2010
      vid: 149
      iid: 2
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        50328789
        10.1007/s11098-009-9346-1
      ppf: 209
      ppct: 22
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 233KB
      tig:
        atl: In defence of error theory.
      aug:
        au:
          Daly, Chris
          Liggins, David
        affil: Philosophy Department, Manchester University, Manchester, UK.
      su:
        Philosophers
        Scholars
        Philosophy
        Humanists
        Error
      sug:
        subj:
          Philosophers
          Scholars
          Philosophy
          Humanists
          Error
      keyword:
        Charity
        Conservatism
        Error theory
        Justification
        Naturalism
        Realism
      ab: Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2010. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2010
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N