The response of worker effort to piece rates: evidence from the British Columbia tree-planting industry.
We measure the elasticity of worker effort with respect to changes in the piece rate using panel data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm. Our data contain information on daily worker productivity and the piece rate received over a five-month period. Using a s...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Human Resources Vol. 34; no. 4; pp. 643 - 668 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
University of Wisconsin Press
Fall99
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=507660623&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 507660623 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0022166X JHR jtl: Journal of Human Resources issn: 0022166X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Fall99 vid: 34 iid: 4 pid: 249 pub: University of Wisconsin Press artinfo: ui: 507660623 10.2307/146411 ppf: 643 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 5.5MB tig: atl: The response of worker effort to piece rates: evidence from the British Columbia tree-planting industry. aug: au: Paarsch, Harry J. Shearer, Bruce su: Piecework Tree farms Agency theory Tree planting Mathematical models in business Labor productivity Lumber industry British Columbia sug: subj: British Columbia Piecework Tree farms Agency theory Tree planting Mathematical models in business Labor productivity Lumber industry ab: We measure the elasticity of worker effort with respect to changes in the piece rate using panel data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm. Our data contain information on daily worker productivity and the piece rate received over a five-month period. Using a structural model to control for the endogeneity of the piece rate, we estimate this elasticity to be approximately 2.14. We also calculate a nonstructural lower bound to this elasticity equal to 0.77. Structural estimation also allows us to perform policy experiments and to compare firm profits under alternative compensation systems. Our results suggest that profits would increase by at least 17 percent were the firm to implement the optimal static contract as predicted by principal-agent theory. This increase in profits would be due to capturing worker rents after the revelation of private information over ability. Yet, only a negligible proportion of these rents could be captured while inducing workers to reveal ability truthfully, suggesting that dynamic considerations were important in determining the firm's actual choice of contract. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|