Sex, Fear, and Greed: A Social Dilemma Analysis of Gender and Cooperation.
Results from previous studies have led many researchers to conclude that sex has no effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. This article reconciles strong theoretical expectations of sex differences in cooperation with the dearth of empirical evidence for such differences. I show that several theo...
| Published in: | Social Forces (University of North Carolina Press) Vol. 82; no. 1; pp. 35 - 53 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / UK
September 2003
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=507847008&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 507847008 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00377732 SFR jtl: Social Forces (University of North Carolina Press) issn: 00377732 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 2003 vid: 82 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / UK artinfo: ui: 507847008 10.1353/sof.2003.0081 ppf: 35 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Sex, Fear, and Greed: A Social Dilemma Analysis of Gender and Cooperation. aug: au: Simpson, Brent su: Prisoner's dilemma game Gender differences (Psychology) Cooperativeness sug: subj: Prisoner's dilemma game Gender differences (Psychology) Cooperativeness ab: Results from previous studies have led many researchers to conclude that sex has no effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. This article reconciles strong theoretical expectations of sex differences in cooperation with the dearth of empirical evidence for such differences. I show that several theories of sex-or gender-related behavior suggest we should expect males and females to respond more strongly to greed and fear, respectively, in social dilemmas. I argue that previous research has failed to find differences because researchers have consistently used the Prisoner's Dilemma game (or its public goods variants) to investigate whether sex affects cooperation. Because Prisoner's Dilemma contains both fear and greed, the theories outlined in this article predict no sex differences in cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma. A series of hypotheses about the conditions under which sex affects cooperation are proposed and tested against the results of two new studies. Results from both studies support two of the three hypotheses. I conclude by discussing some implications of the findings for collective action and inequality and by suggesting directions for future research. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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