Assertion, knowledge, and action.
We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a perso...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 149; no. 1; pp. 99 - 119 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
May2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=50792162&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 50792162 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2010 vid: 149 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 50792162 10.1007/s11098-010-9542-z ppf: 99 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 276KB tig: atl: Assertion, knowledge, and action. aug: au: Maitra, Ishani Weatherson, Brian affil: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, Newark, 430 Conklin Hall, 175 University Avenue Newark 07102 USA Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University & Arché, 1 Seminary Place New Brunswick 08901 USA su: Human acts (Ethics) Assertions (Logic) Theory of knowledge Philosophy Rhetorical theory sug: subj: Human acts (Ethics) Assertions (Logic) Theory of knowledge Philosophy Rhetorical theory keyword: Action Assertion Evidence Knowledge Luminosity Moore’s paradox Moore's paradox ab: We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can’t properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule’s problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2010. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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