An ecology of agency arrangements: mortality of savings and loan associations, 1960-1987.
A study examined whether organizations with different collectivized agency arrangements have different survival prospects. It is proposed that the structure of monitoring and incentive systems determines the agency costs of collectivized agencies and, thus, their vulnerability to competition and en...
| Publicado en: | Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 37; pp. 448 - 471 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Administrative Science Quarterly
September 1992
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=508441586&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 508441586 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00018392 ASQ jtl: Administrative Science Quarterly issn: 00018392 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 1992 vid: 37 pid: 224 pub: Administrative Science Quarterly artinfo: ui: 508441586 10.2307/2393452 ppf: 448 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: An ecology of agency arrangements: mortality of savings and loan associations, 1960-1987. aug: au: Rao, Hayagreeva Neilsen, Eric H. su: Fraternal organizations Stock companies Agency theory Savings & loan associations Bank failures History United States sug: subj: United States Fraternal organizations Stock companies Agency theory Savings & loan associations Bank failures History keyword: Savings and loan associations -- United States -- History Savings banks -- United States -- History ab: A study examined whether organizations with different collectivized agency arrangements have different survival prospects. It is proposed that the structure of monitoring and incentive systems determines the agency costs of collectivized agencies and, thus, their vulnerability to competition and environmental variability. Information on 900 mutual and stock savings and loan associations (SLAs) that were founded between 1960 and 1987 were analyzed. Findings indicate that mutual SLAs are more vulnerable than stock SLAs to competition from commercial banks, but there is no conclusive evidence that mutual SLAs are more susceptible to environmental variability than are stock SLAs. Moreover, deregulation sharply attenuates the agency advantages of stocks, suggesting that agency-cost advantages may be constrained by institutional processes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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