ASCAP versus BMI (versus CBS): modeling competition between and bundling by performance rights organizations.
Bundling has been a long-standing issue in industrial organization. In recent years, bundling has gained renewed controversy as it has been employed by computer software manufacturers. This article examines BMI v. CBS (1979), which dealt with bundling by performance rights organizations (PROs). A mo...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 38; no. 4; pp. 579 - 591 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
October 2000
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510130469&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510130469 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2000 vid: 38 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510130469 10.1093/ei/38.4.579 ppf: 579 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 967KB tig: atl: ASCAP versus BMI (versus CBS): modeling competition between and bundling by performance rights organizations. aug: au: Kleit, Andrew N. su: American Society of Composers Authors & Publishers CBS Television Network Product bundling Mathematical models of economic competition License agreements sug: subj: American Society of Composers Authors & Publishers CBS Television Network Product bundling Mathematical models of economic competition License agreements keyword: American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers -- History Broadcast Music, Inc. -- History ab: Bundling has been a long-standing issue in industrial organization. In recent years, bundling has gained renewed controversy as it has been employed by computer software manufacturers. This article examines BMI v. CBS (1979), which dealt with bundling by performance rights organizations (PROs). A model of competition between PROs using blanket licenses is presented. The usage of blanket licenses is shown to generate both higher profits for PROs and higher costs for the users of musical compositions when there are a small number of competing PROs. In addition, the model explains why blanket licenses are observed in unregulated PRO markets. (JEL L41, K21) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|