Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory.

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve on the unique no-gifts equilibrium by two different types of gift exchange: simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange, but it requires not only mutual trust, lik...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 280 - 298
Autores principales: Heijden, Eline C. M. van der, Nelissen, Jan H. M., Potters, Jan J. M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell April 2001
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: April 2001
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        atl: Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory.
      aug:
        au:
          Heijden, Eline C. M. van der
          Nelissen, Jan H. M.
          Potters, Jan J. M.
      su:
        Economics
        Game theory
        Exchange
        Nash equilibrium
        Two-person zero-sum games
        Experimental design
      sug:
        subj:
          Economics
          Game theory
          Exchange
          Nash equilibrium
          Two-person zero-sum games
          Experimental design
      ab: We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve on the unique no-gifts equilibrium by two different types of gift exchange: simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange, but it requires not only mutual trust, like with simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examine whether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected by the move and matching structure of the game. We find that the so-called partners treatment is a precondition for the occurrence of complex exchange. (JEL C90, D63, H55) Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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