Multinational learning under asymmetric information.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational t...

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Publicado en:Southern Economic Journal Vol. 67; no. 3; pp. 637 - 656
Autores principales: Jain, Neelam, Mirman, Leonard J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Southern Economic Association January 2001
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Multinational learning under asymmetric information.
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          Jain, Neelam
          Mirman, Leonard J.
      su:
        Mathematical models of supply & demand
        Information theory in economics
        Mathematical models
        International business enterprises
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        subj:
          Mathematical models of supply & demand
          Information theory in economics
          Mathematical models
          International business enterprises
      ab: The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational that the demand is low. The multinational reduces its output in the foreign market in order to signal-jam. In addition, the multinational increases its production in the other market. However, total production of the multinational is lower. Implications for research and development expenditure by the multinational are examined. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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