The Influence of Presidential Versus Home State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District Courts.
While many of the decisions of federal district court judges involve the routine application of settled legal rules, a significant minority of their decisions present the judges with the opportunity to engage in judicial policy making. A considerable body of literature suggests that when faced with...
| Publicado en: | Law & Society Review Vol. 36; no. 3; pp. 657 - 676 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510185993&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510185993 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00239216 LSR jtl: Law & Society Review issn: 00239216 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2002 vid: 36 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510185993 10.2307/1512165 ppf: 657 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: The Influence of Presidential Versus Home State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District Courts. aug: au: Johnson, Susan W. Songer, Donald R. su: Judicial selection & appointment Political questions & judicial power District court decisions Political leadership United States sug: subj: United States Judicial selection & appointment Political questions & judicial power District court decisions Political leadership keyword: Judges -- Selection and appointment ab: While many of the decisions of federal district court judges involve the routine application of settled legal rules, a significant minority of their decisions present the judges with the opportunity to engage in judicial policy making. A considerable body of literature suggests that when faced with policy-making opportunities, the policy preferences of the judges exert a significant impact on the nature of those decisions. The present study explores the question of whose preferences are manifested in the policy-relevant decisions of the district court judges. In particular, we seek to determine the relative impact of the preferences of the major elites involved in the selection of federal district judges: the appointing president, home state senators of the president's party, and home state elites outside the Senate who are consulted when a president makes an appointment from a state whose Senate delegation is in the hands of the opposition party. The analysis is based on all published decisions of the district courts in civil liberties, economic and labor, and criminal procedure cases decided between 1961 and 1995. We find that contrary to the expectations derived from the existing literature on district judge appointments, the political preferences of the appointing presidents are most closely related to the policy relevant decisions of the judges. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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