Production, appropriation, and income transfer.

In a conflict between the prey and predator, the availability of income transfer option to the prey, given that defense is already an option, results in equilibrium where both defense and income transfer are utilized and the use of income transfer increases production efficiency by inducing either t...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 40; no. 2; pp. 279 - 288
Autor principal: Noe, Suk Jae
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell April 2002
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Production, appropriation, and income transfer.
      aug:
        au: Noe, Suk Jae
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Economic equilibrium
        Production (Economic theory)
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        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Economic equilibrium
          Production (Economic theory)
      ab: In a conflict between the prey and predator, the availability of income transfer option to the prey, given that defense is already an option, results in equilibrium where both defense and income transfer are utilized and the use of income transfer increases production efficiency by inducing either the prey or predator to divert resources from appropriation to production. The equilibrium amount of defense can be smaller because the prey has an interest in minimizing the amount of transfer that can be achieved in part by provoking a largest possible amount of offense from the predator if actual fight broke out. (JEL C70, D60, D74) Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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