Can Adequate Child Support be Legislated? Responses to Guidelines and Enforcement.

This article explores the relationship between noncustodial parents' willingness to pay child support, state child support guidelines and enforcement efforts, and child support awards and subsequent compliance. Our game theoretic model, which distinguishes cases of asymmetric information from cases...

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Published in:Economic Inquiry Vol. 41; no. 3; pp. 463 - 480
Main Authors: Argys, Laura M., Peters, Elizabeth
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell July 2003
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Can Adequate Child Support be Legislated? Responses to Guidelines and Enforcement.
      aug:
        au:
          Argys, Laura M.
          Peters, Elizabeth
      su:
        Child support laws
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Divorce
        Economics
      sug:
        subj:
          Child support laws
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Divorce
          Economics
      ab: This article explores the relationship between noncustodial parents' willingness to pay child support, state child support guidelines and enforcement efforts, and child support awards and subsequent compliance. Our game theoretic model, which distinguishes cases of asymmetric information from cases of symmetric information, demonstrates that guidelines and increased enforcement can increase payments when awards are court-ordered but may not increase payments and could even reduce child expenditures when some payment would otherwise have occurred voluntarily. Our analyses of awards to divorced or separated mothers from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth are consistent with the model. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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