Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality.
John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most (The Construction of Social Reality), or, for that ma...
| Publicado en: | American Journal of Economics & Sociology Vol. 62; no. 1; pp. 209 - 233 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
January 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510294527&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510294527 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00029246 AES jtl: American Journal of Economics & Sociology issn: 00029246 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 2003 vid: 62 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510294527 10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00008 ppf: 209 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality. aug: au: Zaibert, L. A. su: Searle, John R., 1932-2025 Act psychology Collective behavior Social theory Reality sug: subj: Act psychology Collective behavior Social theory Reality Searle, John R., 1932-2025 ab: John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most (The Construction of Social Reality), or, for that matter, in any other of Searle's major books. The only account, and a defective one at that (so I argue), is found in a short, somewhat obscure article entitled “Collective Intentions and Actions,” but in fact what Searle presents there is, at best, an account of collective actions, not of collective intentions. In light of Searle own ground-breaking work in the philosophy of mind, and in particular in light of his far-reaching analyses showing how intentions differ from related mental states, I argue that collective intentions are not consistent with Searle's philosophy of mind. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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