Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study.
We report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once publi...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 41; no. 4; pp. 574 - 592 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
October 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510294720&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510294720 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2003 vid: 41 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510294720 10.1093/ei/cbg029 ppf: 574 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study. aug: au: Broseta, Bruno Fatas, Enrique Neugebauer, Tibor su: Economic equilibrium Economics Game theory Public goods Experimental economics sug: subj: Economic equilibrium Economics Game theory Public goods Experimental economics ab: We report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once public good provision is obtained, the auction price at the preliminary stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. Individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy are neither able to force lower market prices nor to affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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