Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales.

Professions are granted a form of cartel that enables them to charge more than would arise in a free market on the assumption that they provide better quality and are more trustworthy than free-market actors would be. The theoretical assumption that lawyers are more competent than nonlawyers has giv...

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Publicado en:Law & Society Review Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 765 - 809
Autores principales: Moorhead, Richard, Paterson, Alan, Sherr, Avrom
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell December 2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: December 2003
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        atl: Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales.
      aug:
        au:
          Moorhead, Richard
          Paterson, Alan
          Sherr, Avrom
      su:
        Lawyers
        Occupational prestige
        Legal assistants
        Paraprofessionals
        Legal aid
        United Kingdom
      sug:
        subj:
          United Kingdom
          Lawyers
          Occupational prestige
          Legal assistants
          Paraprofessionals
          Legal aid
      ab: Professions are granted a form of cartel that enables them to charge more than would arise in a free market on the assumption that they provide better quality and are more trustworthy than free-market actors would be. The theoretical assumption that lawyers are more competent than nonlawyers has given rise to significant formal protections for professions in many jurisdictions. Two testable propositions arise from this theory: (1) lawyers cost more, but (2) they deliver higher quality. It is a testing of these twin propositions that is the subject of this article, with well-triangulated data and a deeper understanding of the theoretical differences between lawyers and nonlawyers. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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