Union rents as a source of takeover gains among target shareholders.
This paper tests the hypothesis that the substantial gains enjoyed by shareholders in target firms during the corporate acquisition boom of the 1980's reflected, in part, shareholders' recouping of the value of “rents” (in the form of wage premiums, higher fringe benefits, and constraints on manager...
| Publicado en: | Industrial & Labor Relations Review Vol. 49; pp. 3 - 20 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cornell University
October 1995
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510377208&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510377208 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00197939 ILR jtl: Industrial & Labor Relations Review issn: 00197939 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 1995 vid: 49 pid: 140 pub: Cornell University artinfo: ui: 510377208 10.2307/2524909 ppf: 3 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Union rents as a source of takeover gains among target shareholders. aug: au: Becker, Brian E. su: Labor unions Stockholders Valuation of corporations Economics Mergers & acquisitions Finance United States sug: subj: United States Labor unions Stockholders Valuation of corporations Economics Mergers & acquisitions Finance ab: This paper tests the hypothesis that the substantial gains enjoyed by shareholders in target firms during the corporate acquisition boom of the 1980's reflected, in part, shareholders' recouping of the value of “rents” (in the form of wage premiums, higher fringe benefits, and constraints on managerial authority) held by unionized labor. Analyzing data on the merger and acquisition experience of nearly 300 large publicly traded target firms during the period 1982-86, the author finds, consistent with that hypothesis, that shareholders' average returns from takeover activity were higher in unionized target firms (41%) than in nonunion target firms (35%). For unionized workers, these effects are equivalent to an annualized employee “loss” approaching 8% of annual earnings, or 50% of the wage premium conventionally associated with coverage. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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