Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation.

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increa...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 43; no. 1; pp. 55 - 67
Autor principal: De Silva, Dakshina G.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell January 2005
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation.
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        au: De Silva, Dakshina G.
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        Mathematical models
        Public contracts
        Auctions
        Road construction
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          Mathematical models
          Public contracts
          Auctions
          Road construction
      ab: This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44) Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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