Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence.
Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypot...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 43; no. 1; pp. 13 - 24 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
January 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypothesis. The probability of observing an enforced insider trading law is much lower in autocracies than in other countries. (JEL D73, G28, L51) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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