Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test.

Nonbinding recommendations, such as provided by fact-finders, are shown to significantly increase voluntary settlements in bargaining. Theoretically, it is unclear whether recommendations will increase settlement rates. A recommendation may reduce outcome uncertainty, thereby “chilling” bargaining a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 401 - 417
Autores principales: Dickinson, David L., Hunnicutt, Lynn
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell April 2005
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Nonbinding recommendations, such as provided by fact-finders, are shown to significantly increase voluntary settlements in bargaining. Theoretically, it is unclear whether recommendations will increase settlement rates. A recommendation may reduce outcome uncertainty, thereby “chilling” bargaining and increasing dispute rates. On the other hand, a recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which an agreement is made Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using theory and data from controlled bargaining experiments. The data show the dominance of a focal point effect for suggestions, highlighting their potential role in improving dispute settlement procedures. (JEL C78, C92, J52) Reprinted by permission of the publisher.