Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and Presidential Decision Making: A Theory and Test.
The institutionalization of a White House-centered presidential staff system is often described as a logical response by presidents to increasing leadership demands linked to the post-World War II growth in government size and complexity. In contrast, I take a supply-side perspective, using transact...
| Publicado en: | Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 259 - 289 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
June 2005
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510508337&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510508337 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03604918 PRQ jtl: Presidential Studies Quarterly issn: 03604918 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: June 2005 vid: 35 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510508337 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2005.00248.x ppf: 259 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and Presidential Decision Making: A Theory and Test. aug: au: Dickinson, Matthew J. su: Presidential power [Treatise]: Neustadt, Richard E. White House staff Decision making in international relations United States sug: subj: United States Presidential power [Treatise]: Neustadt, Richard E. White House staff Decision making in international relations keyword: Neustadt, Richard E., 1919-2003 -- Work -- Presidential power ab: The institutionalization of a White House-centered presidential staff system is often described as a logical response by presidents to increasing leadership demands linked to the post-World War II growth in government size and complexity. In contrast, I take a supply-side perspective, using transaction-cost theory and insights from Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power to argue that staff growth reflects successive presidents' search for information and expertise with which to reduce bargaining uncertainty. Once institutionalized, however, staff must be managed. Again building on Neustadt's and new institutionalist insights, I find evidence that presidents using redundant staff structures and competitive staff practices perform more effectively during foreign-policy crises. The findings suggest potential pitfalls with the “standard” staff model in use today. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|