The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow.

This article draws on various theories of organization and hierarchy to argue that presidential staff may be conceived as a necessary limiting structure on an otherwise chaotic informational environment. As such, the shape of that structure shapes the kind, caliber, and amount of information preside...

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Published in:Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 333 - 361
Main Author: Rudalevige, Andrew
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell June 2005
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Rudalevige, Andrew
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        White House staff
        Decision making in political science
        United States
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          United States
          White House staff
          Decision making in political science
      ab: This article draws on various theories of organization and hierarchy to argue that presidential staff may be conceived as a necessary limiting structure on an otherwise chaotic informational environment. As such, the shape of that structure shapes the kind, caliber, and amount of information presidents receive on policy matters. Melding classic organization theory and recent formal work with earlier hypotheses about staff effectiveness, I argue that informational institutions centered on functional rather than specific policy lines will best serve the president, and that parallel processing and other monitoring mechanisms will also help the president obtain good advice. Evidence from the Truman, Reagan, and Bush 11 administrations is used to illustrate this theory and sketch a more systematic research agenda. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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