The Case for Inflation Targeting.
Part of a special issue on Federal Reserve policy in the face of economic crises. The writer explores whether inflation targeting represents a suitable policy for the U.S. Federal Reserve. In order to answer the question, he examines whether the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) controls inflat...
| Publicado en: | CATO Journal Vol. 27; no. 2; pp. 273 - 282 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cato Institute
Spring/Summer 2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510617649&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510617649 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02733072 CAO jtl: CATO Journal issn: 02733072 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring/Summer 2007 vid: 27 iid: 2 pid: 1630 pub: Cato Institute artinfo: ui: 510617649 ppf: 273 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 501KB tig: atl: The Case for Inflation Targeting. aug: au: Hetzel, Robert L. su: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) Price inflation Monetary policy United States sug: subj: United States Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) Price inflation Monetary policy ab: Part of a special issue on Federal Reserve policy in the face of economic crises. The writer explores whether inflation targeting represents a suitable policy for the U.S. Federal Reserve. In order to answer the question, he examines whether the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) controls inflation, and how the dual mandate of the federal reserve—to promote both stable prices and “maximum employment”—constrains the way the FOMC implements monetary policy. He then examines the assumption that a Phillips curve trade-off exists between unemployment and inflation that is invariant to changes in the systematic behavior of the central bank. The writer concludes that an inflation target is indeed a suitable policy for a central bank and that such a target would improve both the conduct of monetary policy and central bank accountability. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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