The Double-Auction Gambling Market: An Experimental Examination.
I examine a new sports wagering mechanism that utilizes a double auction rather than the traditional wager matching bookmaker. Laboratory experiments were performed that modeled the two institutions in an attempt to compare the efficiency and volatility of the new mechanism versus the status quo. Th...
| Publicado en: | American Journal of Economics & Sociology Vol. 66; no. 3; pp. 493 - 533 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I examine a new sports wagering mechanism that utilizes a double auction rather than the traditional wager matching bookmaker. Laboratory experiments were performed that modeled the two institutions in an attempt to compare the efficiency and volatility of the new mechanism versus the status quo. The new proposed double auction institution was less efficient and more volatile than the matching mechanism. However, the relative performance of the double auction mechanism was significantly improved by an increase in the size of the market. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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