You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy.

Chile's 1989 constitutional reforms constituted a trade-off: the military gave up protected democracy provisions but acquired greater autonomy. The democratic opposition could accept or reject, but not modify, constitutional changes proposed by the outgoing dictatorship. This study addresses a very...

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Published in:Latin American Politics & Society Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 163 - 191
Main Authors: Heiss, Claudia, Navia, Patricio
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Fall 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy.
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          Heiss, Claudia
          Navia, Patricio
      su:
        Armed Forces in politics
        Democratization
        Armed forces
        Constitutional law
        Chile
      sug:
        subj:
          Chile
          Armed Forces in politics
          Democratization
          Armed forces
          Constitutional law
      ab: Chile's 1989 constitutional reforms constituted a trade-off: the military gave up protected democracy provisions but acquired greater autonomy. The democratic opposition could accept or reject, but not modify, constitutional changes proposed by the outgoing dictatorship. This study addresses a very limited time period in the transition to democracy: the moment after the transition has been secured and transitional rules have been established. The dynamics of this period differ markedly from those in the larger democratic transition. The approach in this study complements alternative explanations of why the 1989 reforms benefited the outgoing dictatorship more than the incoming democratic government. Although the outgoing regime granted several opposition demands by reducing restrictions on political pluralism and eliminating barriers to political party activity, it also secured provisions that made the military more independent of civilian authorities than originally conceived in the 1980 Constitution. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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