Some Evidence on Late Bidding in eBay Auctions.
Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-time. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding coul...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 369 - 380 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510827654&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510827654 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2008 vid: 46 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510827654 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00097.x ppf: 369 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 788KB tig: atl: Some Evidence on Late Bidding in eBay Auctions. aug: au: Wintr, Ladislav su: eBay Inc. Auctions Mathematical models Internet auctions sug: subj: eBay Inc. Auctions Mathematical models Internet auctions ab: Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-time. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid, while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlier. (JEL D44) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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